Security policies define how information within a computer system is to be used.
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INTRODUCTION
Within computer systems we distinguish between different kinds of information based on a variety of reasons (for example, privacy of individuals which the information describes, laws, cost of theft); in addition, we wish to control how each of the different kinds of information is used. This problem of information control is analogous to one in society, where we wish to control who obtains certain information, the time at which they obtain it as well as which of their subsequent actions are influenced by having the information.
Such control of information is difficult to implement in society.
The control of information dissemination has proved to be difficult to implement in computer systems as well and is currently the subject of study by many researchers: [Bell] , [Jones] , [Lampson] , [Popek] , [Schroeder] , [Walter] , [Weissman] , [Wulf] .
The need for precise and complete understanding of the basic questions is mandatory.
To illustrate this, compare security enforcement flaws to compiler design flaws. When a compiler error occurs, the users complain and demand correction. On the other hand, when a security error occurs, the violator does not disclose the system flaw that allowed him to perform prohibited actions.
Often in the case of information theft, no trace remains to show that one user read information private to another. For these reasons precision and proofs are not a luxury, but a necessity.
While precision and proofs are required, in order to be credible the basic framework must be simple and clear. No one will believe an unstructured system is secure; just as no one will believe that a formal proof is correct if *A children's tale observes that if one person knows a secret, it's a secret but lf two people know a secret, it's soon public knowledge. ' it is too long or poorly structured. The proof of security properties of a computer system is especially sensitive to this issue because such properties span the entire system, not merely a single module of the system. We conclude that to be useful the basis of a theory in the security area must be very simple.
This paper presents a framework in which the underlying principles of security can be investigated. We believe it to be both precise and yet simple.
The basic elements of our theory are: a precise definition of a security policy of information control, simple enough so that the ramifications of the policy are clear, and a protection mechanism whose purpose is to 'enforce* a given security policy. Further, we relate these two in terms of soundness and completeness. These terms are discussed informally below.
A security policy, defining what information is to be protected, has a non-procedural form. The definition of a protection mechanism, on the other hand, is procedural.
A protection mechanism is sound provided it enforces the given security policy. Thus soundness is the bridge between the non-procedural security policy and the procedural protection mechanism. Currently this relation is unclear in existing security systems. When a software designer is asked to define the security policies his protection mechanism can enforce his answer is phrased in terms of a procedural description of some of the possible state changes of his mechanism. Such a description is insufficient. A security policy must be expressed in a language such that the policy 1 s author is con-
vinced it is what he intended.
While the above discussion suggests that soundness is a binary relation between protection mechanisms and security policies, such is not the case. Completeness is a measure of how well a given protection mechanism performs. Sound protection mechanisms abound; the key is to find those that are complete in that they allow the user to do as much as possible. The importance of completeness is unclear in current literature; here it has central importance.
One way to evaluate a framework such as the one developed here is to see what results have come as a consequence of the theory. There are four principal results. First, we have developed a new protection mechanism called the surveillance protection mechanism. Second, we can faithfully represent parts of actual security systems in this framework. Third, we can show that the surveillance mechanism is more complete than several other existing protection mechanisms. Fourth, we can show that there exists a maximal protection mechani sm. Though the. union of mechanisms can be used to derive increasingly powerful mechanisms, the maximal protection mechanism cannot necessarily be effectively discovered.
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II. BASIC MODEL
The first concept to be defined is the concept of a computer program.
We define Q to be a program provided is that it is independent of any particular model or grain of computation.
We now turn our attention to the study of protection mechanisms.
Definition. Suppose that Q: D.jX...xD k -> E 1 x...xE n is a program. Then M is a protection mechanism for Q provided M: D.jX...xD k -+ Ejx...xE^ and E| = E, U F where F is disjoint from E i for all i, and for all Xj,...,x k and 1 ^ i <> n
The set F consists of the violation notices of M.
-5-A protection mechanism acts as follows: For input a and for each i the mechanism decides whether or not to give the output value Q^(a).
If it decides not to allow this output, then the protection mechanism gives a violation notice from F. The key constraint on the protection mechanism M is that it must act simply as a "gatekeeper" (see Figure 1) ; it can allow the normal output or an output from F. Intuitively violation notices, i.e., elements from F, can be thought of as alleged attempted violations. The definition of protection mechanism is quite general in that the protection mechanism can decide whether or not to output Q(a), based on any criterion at all. Note that any program satisfying these constraints is a protection mechanism. We make no assumption about whether it executes, interprets or even simulates the program Q.
> output Q(x 1 ,...,x ) output violation notice(s) Figure 1 . A functional view of a protection mechanism for Q.
More concretely, suppose that a user submits a job to a computer system, and then waits for his output from a line printer in a batch environment or from an interactive terminal in a time sharing environment. In an unprotected a denotes a respec otes a 1 »--^a k the actual input values for input variables x ,...,x tively; the value of k will always be clear from the context] k computer system the user will always receive Q(a) s that is, the result of his computation* In a protected computer system he may or may not receive Q(a): if his computations violated no 'rules', then he will receive Q(a);
otherwise, he will receive a violation notice.
It is important, to note that M always outputs something. This restriction that M be total is an entirely practical one* In any real computer system., programs are never allowed to run forever. Moreover, at the cost of some complexity in our theory we could extend the concept of program to partial functions, i.e. to programs that did not always halt. However, the cost seems to outweigh the advantages; therefore, in this paper all programs will be assumed to be total,
The purpose of protection mechanism is to 'control information flow 1 ;
in our framework this means to enforce security policies. As an example, consider an accounting program, TAX, which accepts a taxpayer identification file, NAME-ADDR, and another file (or set of files) FIN describing the taxpayer 1 s financial situation. TAX produces two outputs: a bill for the taxpayer and a completed U.S. 1040 federal tax form. The taxpayer receives both, but one copy of the bill goes to the author of the TAX program. TAX is to be confined [Lampson] from disclosing to the author of TAX any information private to the taxpayer, thus the bill is to depend only on the name and address of the taxpayer, but not on his financial status.
(We assume that all bills for the use of TAX are for the same amount.)
Graphically TAX can be depicted depend only on the NAME-ADDR file, presumably the name and address of the taxpayer. A sound protection mechanism for TAX and (I^9I^9I^) need only insure that neither copy of the bill depends on information in FIN.
We are defining a theory of security, a subject about which we have many intuitive notions, so it is important to cover the very large class of security policies that one might reasonably wish to enforce using a protection mechanism in a computer system. We distinguish between 'access control 1 policies which specify whether a particular access operation to manipulate an object containing information is permitted and the more general 'information control' policies which restrict the use of information. For example, enforcing an access control policy which specifies that the operation READFILE(F) cannot be performed on the object F, is not the same as insuring that the information in F is not extracted. There may be a sequence of operations (excluding READFILE(F)) which in effect extracts the information encoded in F. Access control policies do not take into account the semantics of the operations permitted and prohibited, and thus are a proper subset of the information control policies.
To illustrate the difference by an analogy, consider a painter (analogous to a program) who is to paint a picture (the output) without green paint. This could be enforced by an access control protection mechanism in the framework we have already defined, provided all the green paint were in a known set of pots. A sound protection mechanism would simply not allow the painter to dip his brush into those pots.
However, the policy of forbidding the use of green paint is not an access control policy; it is an information control policy; for if the painter is simultaneously able to obtain blue and yellow paint, he can mix green paint and use it, violating the original policy to be enforced. Most protection mechanisms found in extant programmed systems, particularly operating systems, are capable of enforcing some subset of the access control policies
and not the more general information control policies. We have not restricted our framework to access control policies, though we could alter it to do so.
Instead we consider a subset of the larger class of phenomena the information control policies. This should become evident in the presentation of the surveillance protection mechanism in the next section. Note that the argument that M is sound for any policy is based on the fact that M is a constant function. However, we can simply observe the running time of M and conclude whether x^=0 or x^O. This failure of our notion of sound stems not from any failure in our definitions, but from the fact that the Observability Postulate was violated. M ! s running time was an implicit output.
The above example is compatible with our framework as follows: Let us agree that programs will output not just computed output value(s), but a summary of their entire computational history. In this case, they will also output a single variable T (standing for f time', the only computational history observable) which is the elapsed real time, the elapsed compute time or the number of steps executed. Now, the Observability Postulate is no longer vio- Heat radiation of computer components may be detectable. The pattern of tape movements can encode information visably detectable by someone in the computer room. Even patterns of a program's use of operating system resources may be detectable by other programs. This, too, constitutes a (potential) output.
Before a sound protection mechanism for a program can be defined, all these observables must be specified as outputs of that program. In the 'worst case', the program will be defined to output S n ,...,S where is U m U the initial state of the program, S is the final state and S. , follows m l-l directly from for i=0,...,m-l. What comprises the state has been determined by what a priori is known to be observable.
One further example should reinforce the subtlety and importance of the Observability Postulate. Let our programs have inputs that are placed on a linear 1-way read only tape (automata theorists read Turing tape; non automata theorists read magnetic tape) with the read head initially at the leftmost character:
Consider a protection mechanism M and the security policy I = {^2}'
We assert that M can never both read x 2 and also be sound as long as our programs output their entire computational history. This follows since in order for M to get to the part of the tape where x 2 is stored it must move across . Even if M does not 'look at x^1, it will encode the length of x^ into the computation sequence of M; hence, M will not be sound. Now we see that our definition of sound is quite correct in not allowing M to be sound. However, suppose that we wish to be able to allow inputs to be on linear tapes; how can we avoid this problem? One answer is to add a new operation, say, tab(i).
This operation in one step causes the read head to jump directly to the input part of the tape corresponding to x^. Now we can indeed have a protection mechanism that can read x^ and is sound. But a new problem arises: is the Observability Postulate still valid? Perhaps tab(i) takes time dependent on the length of X-9•.* 9x. 1> and moreover perhaps this time is observable. This is the crux of the problem and there seem to be two answers:
(1) run tab(i) so that it uses constant time or (2) apply our methods recursively to tab(i).
In general we can always attempt to make the problem of constructing a protection mechanism easier by causing execution attributes to be made non 
Proof.
Immediate from the definitions.
We can easily generalize Theorem 1 to show that from the sound protec- We have established that the maximal protection mechanism always exists;
however, as we shall show in Section V, they cannot always be constructed. 
III. SURVEILLANCE PROTECTION MECHANISM
This section both illustrates a new protection mechanism and the framework developed in the preceding section. In order to define this mechanism we will first restrict our programs to be flowcharts with a single output.
We will then show how to assign to each flowchart and security policy a protection mechanism called the surveillance protection mechanism. This protection mechanism is then proved to be sound in Theorem 3. 
,^).
Suppose now that a is an input for Q. Then Q(a) is a pair, the first component of which is the computed output and the second component of which is the number of steps executed. We ascribe to the flowchart F the usual semantics: There is exactly one start box; execution begins there by initializing x to a, and r and y to 0 and 0. C is defined to be the program counter of F, a variable which contains the name of the next box to be executed. C is initialized to contain the successor of the start box. Execution then follows the logic of the flowchart; at a decision box the path corresponding to the predicate's truth value is taken. The predicates in the decision boxes and the expressions in assignments are assumed to be interpreted in the sense of schemata theory [Manna] ; however, no specific assumptions are made about what predicates and expressions are allowed. Note that inputs do not get assigned during a computation* A halt box is executed by making available to the external world an ordered pair consisting of the value of y and the number of steps executed.
Definition. Suppose that Q is a flowchart program. Associate with each Therefore we will be encoding running time. We might have chosen number of page faults, kilowatt-hours consumed, or the sequence of boxes executed. However, we have arbitrarily selected running time as a representative attribute of execution that is observable. 
IV. HIGH WATER MARK PROTECTION MECHANISM
In the last section the surveillance protection mechanism was presented;
here we will present a second protection mechanism called the high water mark protection mechanism. It is essentially the basis for some government, particularly military, information systems; it is also an abstraction of the protection mechanism used in the ADEPT-50 operating system described in [Weissman] .
The high water mark protection is included here for two reasons: (i) the fact that we can represent it demonstrates the power of our framework; (ii) it is both sound and unsound 1 The reason for the latter requires some further explanation that depends on the Observability Postulate.
The high water mark mechanism is sound only in the case that the observables do not include certain attributes of the computational history of programs.
If flowchart programs output their history, for example their running time as in Section III, then the high water mark protection mechanism is unsound. Essentially it is unsound since it cannot detect that a program is leaking information by varying the run time (as we will later show).
On the other hand, suppose that we modify the definition of flowchart programs so that they only output their computed output variable values. Then we can prove that the high water mark protection mechanism is sound. It is interesting to note that our framework is general enough to allow a mechanism to be both sound and unsound under varying specifications of observables.
In order to define the high water mark protection mechanism, let Q be a flowchart program and let I be a security policy (for the moment we will not specify whether or not Q outputs its computational history as well as its computed output variable). We further assume that we are given a set F linearly ordered by > and a function from the variables of the flowchart Q to the set F. We also assume that there exists an element p in F such that for any v in I and any w not in I,
We intuitively interpret this as follows:
1, F is a set of 'classifications 1 such as 'top secret', 'secret', 'confidential', 'public' which are ordered so that top secret > secret > confidential > public.
2.
Initially all the variables in a security policy I are given some classification equal to or lower than p; all other variables are given some classification higher than p.
As in the construction of the surveillance protection mechanism we associate with each variable v of Q a new variable v: v has values in F. The high water mark protection mechanism M is constructed by the following local transformations on Q:
1. After the START box initialize all variables v to F Q (v).
2. Replace the assignment box The high water mark protection mechanism M for Q always outputs a violation notice in the form (A,i) However, the length of the computation sequence of M depends directly on x 1 : if x ] = 0 it is 4 ; if x ] / 0 it is 10 +4. Therefore, in this case the high water mark protection mechanism is unsound.
We stated earlier that the Observability Postulate must always be valid • all potential outputs of a program must be known. This discussion provides one illustration of a protection mechanism which is ineffective or unsound when those observables ara of a certain class, i.e. running time.
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V. COMPARISON OF PROTECTION MECHANISMS
In the last two sections the surveillance and high water mark protection mechanisms were presented and both were shown to be sound under the assumption that programs output only their final states. As noted earlier, sound is only part of the story; here their ordering with respect to completeness is considered. While soundness is all or none we will see that with respect to completeness there is indeed a spectrum of possible values. Suppose that during a program Q's computation it must use a block of memory that earlier held 'sensitive data 1 . Surveillance will allow Q(a) (a = the input value), provided Q correctly 'zeroes 1 out the block of memory; the high water mark mechanism will never output Q(a), even after this zeroing.
A skeptical reader may reply that this example is artificial. Why not just rewrite Q so that no unneeded assignments are performed? But consider the case of a program where early in the program a variable is assigned a value which is never subsequently used before the variable is reassigned. This is indeed reasonable: often in software that value would have been used had the inputs been different.
While surveillance is more complete than high water mark it is not maximal, i.e. it is not the mechanism that produces the fewest violation notices. The reason that the surveillance protection mechanism performed poorly on is that once we branched on x^ there was no way for surveillance to detect that the assignment to y was independent of x^. For the remaining part of this section we will investigate how to modify surveillance so as to make it more complete. We will continue to assume that programs only output explicitly computed values. This is done only for definiteness; whether or not programs also output their running time or any other attribute makes no difference in the following analysis..
As a step in the direction of improving surveillance suppose that we modified it so that it could detect flowchart occurrences of the form:
For these 1 i^f then else' constructs could we make all future computations independent of whether the then or the else path was taken so that the resulting protection mechanism is still sound? The answer is yes and is demonstrated by looking first at the example if^ then else of Q: Thus, the danger is that since one does not know which branch was taken one must assume the worst case.
In summary, whether to apply a transform or not is not a clearcut decision.
The optimal way to do this is yet unclear. Indeed we can prove that there is no effective way to get the maximal protection mechanism.
Theorem 5. Given a flowchart program Q and a security policy I it is not effectively decidable if M is sound and maximal for Q and I.
Proof. Consider the following program Q and the security policy I that is the empty set: Now (1) shows that if we can effectively construct M, then we can effectively determine whether or not Vx A(x) = 0; this, however, is impossible.
•
The fact that the maximal protection mechanism is not effectively constructible should be contrasted with a similar result from capability theory [Harrison] . Essentially it has been shown that one cannot effectively determine if a program will ever make an 1 illegal access 1 . This results from the fact that it is impossible to a priori determine which execution sequence a program will take. In a sense, therefore, one cannot determine statically 
VI. PROTECTION MECHANISMS EXTENSIONS
The surveillance protection mechanism for flowchart programs is not sufficient for practical computation. If possible, it should be extended to more complex programs: programs that allow procedures, pointer variables, and parallelism are possible candidates. Some of these extensions, as indicated in Section V, will be straightforward. Others, however, may be difficult.
We wish to discuss a simple example of the difficulty of correctly extending the surveillance mechanism. Hopefully this example will show some of the subtleties of the area of security enforcement.
As in Section IV we will for the rest of this section assume that programs only output their explicitly computed outputs. It is under this seemingly simplifying assumption that we will present an example of the difficulty of extensions to the surveillance mechanism.
A reasonable extension to the surveillance method is the following: Suppose that R is a single entry and single exit part of a larger flowchart; for example, R is It is not sound even in the presence of our assumption that only explicitly computed values are output.
